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Great attention is now being paid to global imbalances, the growing U.S. current account deficit financed
by growing surpluses in the rest of the world. How can the issue be understood in a more historical
perspective? We seek a meaningful comparison between the two eras of globalization: "then" (the
period 1870 to 1913) and "now" (the period since the 1970s). We look at the two hegemons in each
era: Britain then, and the United States now. And adducing historical data to match what we know
from the contemporary record, we proceed in the tradition of New Comparative Economic History
to see what lessons the past might have for the present. We consider two of the most controversial
and pressing questions in the current debate. First, are current imbalances being sustained, at least
in part, by return differentials? And if so, is this reassuring? Second, how will adjustment take place?
Will it be a hard or soft landing? Pessimistically, we find no historical evidence that return differentials
last forever, even for hegemons. Optimistically, we find that adjustments to imbalances in the past
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The unending feedback of the dollars and pounds received by the European countries to 
the overseas countries from which they had come reduced the international monetary 
system to a mere child’s game in which one party had agreed to return the loser’s stake 
after each game of marbles—Jacques Rueff, 1961
1 
 
A remarkable amount of attention is now being paid to global imbalances, the growing 
U.S. current account deficit financed by growing surpluses in the rest of the world, most 
notably in the Asian “dollar bloc” and among the oil exporters. The talk is no longer 
confined to obscure academic and policy debates. With insufficient space in his weekly 
columns to devote to the issue, the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf launched a web site 
stating that “what is happening is extraordinary”; David Warsh considers the almost 
obsessive focus on the issue justified, since global imbalances constitute “the most 
exciting economic story of our times.”
2 
Exciting and extraordinary it may be, but a relentless focus on trends from the 
recent past, on the current announcements of each quarter’s balance of payments data, or 
on naive extrapolations into the future has left one important perspective rather neglected: 
how can the issue of global imbalances be understood in a more historical perspective? 
To address this question, we seek a meaningful comparison between past and 
present experience. We focus on the two eras of globalization: “then” (the period 1870 to 
1913) and “now” (the period since the 1970s). We look at the special position in the 
global macroeconomy of the hegemons in each era: Britain then, and the United States 
now. And adducing historical data to match what we know from the contemporary 
record, we proceed in the tradition of New Comparative Economic History to see what 
lessons the past might have for the present. 
Although such an exercise in quantitative economic history could range far and 
wide, in this paper space limitations permit us only to look at what we consider two of the 
most controversial and pressing questions in the current debate. 
First, are current imbalances being sustained, at least in part, by return 
differentials? And if so, is this reassuring? If the U.S. can always earn some kind of 
“privilege” of this sort, then the degree of required adjustment will be reduced. Or, 
putting it another way, for any given trajectory of trade imbalances, we know that the 
current account and debt implications will look much more favorable or sustainable if 
such privileges persist. If not, any difficulties will be that much more pronounced. 
Second, how will adjustment take place? Will it be a hard or soft landing? It is 
possible, again, that adjustments will happen smoothly. Depending on the extent to which 
expenditure shifts rather than switches, countries might avoid dramatic real exchange rate 
movement. If up and down shifts are coordinated across countries, or if switching is 
unhindered by trade policies or other frictions, then global demand might hold up, and 
recession avoided. The fear is that adjustments might be much more abrupt, demand large 
changes in real exchange rates, lead to politically awkward realignments of trade, and 
cause recession for one or more players in the game. If such a hard landing is likely, then 
policymakers face the challenge of devising suitable countermeasures. 
                                                 
1 On the source of this quotation, see the comment by John Helliwell. 
2 For Warsh on Wolf see http://www.economicprincipals.com/issues/05.04.10.html. For the Wolf forum see 
http://www.ftblogs.typepad.com/martin_wolf/. For up to the minute discussions see 
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/setser/. For a recent overview, see Eichengreen (2006).  3  
Confronting these two questions, what insights can we take from the past? 
Summary 
To summarize our findings, on the persistence of privilege we find: 
o  Among G7 countries today, the United States is not unique in being able to enjoy 
a “privilege” in the form of higher yields earned on external assets relative to 
yields paid on external liabilities. For the U.S. this has been worth about 0.5% of 
GDP to the U.S. in the years 1981 to 2003. Similar privileges are detectable for 
Japan and the U.K. France and Germany appear to have no privilege. Canada and 
Italy have negative privilege, or penalty. 
o  In the years 1870–1913, the previous financial hegemon, Britain, enjoyed a 
similar yield privilege, also amounting to about 0.5% of GDP. 
o  Measured as a differential in rates of yield, the U.S. privilege has been steadily 
declining since the 1960s, when it stood at around 3% per annum on all capital. It 
is now close to 1% per annum. Indirect measures may differ, and even the direct 
measures are subject to error. But if this trend continues, the U.S. will lose its 
privilege. 
o  Direct and indirect evidence on rates of yield for Britain in the past also suggests 
small and declining rates of yield privilege from the 1870s to 1910s, a similar 
pattern. 
o  For both the U.S. now and Britain then, declining rate of yield privilege meant 
that for a given leverage and a given composition of assets and liabilities, the 
income due to privilege (as a fraction of GDP) would have to shrink. In part this 
was offset either by expanding leverage (in the U.S case today) or by shifting 
composition to riskier assets with higher returns (in both cases). These shifts may 
not be able to proceed without limit. 
o  It is often suggested that the U.S. might lose privilege if the net debt position 
grows too large. We find that rate of yield privilege has been correlated with the 
deterioration of the net external asset position in the postwar era. 
o  In the historical British case, leverage and indebtedness were not an issue. British 
net external assets roughly equaled gross external assets, and Britain became a 
very large net creditor. But a net credit position did not preclude a loss of 
privilege, suggesting that even if the U.S. could reverse its net debt position, this 
would not protect its privilege automatically. 
o  Rather, British experience suggests that over time, financial hegemons operating 
in a globalizing world face other pressures that squeeze privilege. Emerging 
markets mature and offer less outlandish risk-reward combinations, so the benefit 
of being a “loan shark” diminishes; the world becomes less risky as a whole; at 
the same time other rival financial centers emerge which can compete for 
lucrative business with the financial pioneer. 
o  Most of these perspectives bode ill for the persistence of privilege. But if we add 
capital gains to yields we can estimate a total return privilege for the U.S. 
According to indirect estimates, total return privilege has risen since the 1960s. It 
also appears to have been steady in the 1980s and 1990s. Growing valuation 
effects have offset falling yield differentials, keeping up a total return privilege. It 
is unclear what mechanisms are driving these opposing trends.  4  
o  Looking at indirect evidence on total returns on the U.K. domestic and foreign 
portfolio 1870–1913, we also find a total return differential, but one that is very 
volatile over successive decades, and with very little systematic privilege overall. 
o  The large capital gains earned by the U.S. in the last 10 to 15 years are due to 
neither sustained price effects nor sustained exchange rate effects, both of which 
are close to zero on average; the effect is largely due to “other” capital gains. 
These remain a mystery, and until we understand them better, simple 
extrapolation of these trends may be ill advised. 
On adjustment we examine the behavior of current accounts and the processes associated 
with current account reversals for a broad sample of countries between 1880 and 1913. 
We attempt to verify whether there are any differences between the capital exporters 
like Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, other core countries that import 
capital, areas that had recently been settled, also known as British offshoots (i.e., 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), and less developed peripheral 
nations. Throughout we compare our findings to those from Edwards (2004) from the 
thirty years between 1970 and 2001. 
In particular we look at: summary statistics regarding the size of current accounts and 
incidence of reversals; the ability to sustain current account deficits or surpluses; 
connections between current account reversals, exchange rate movements and financial 
crises; patterns of movement of macroeconomic aggregates in the wake of large current 
account reversals including the growth effects of reversals. 
o  We find that more developed countries and the offshoots were able to run higher 
current account deficits more persistently, and that these countries had very 
different patterns of adjustment. 
o  In particular their current account reversals were generally associated with smaller 
real exchange rate fluctuations and less adjustment in the government surplus. 
o  Overall, we do not find overwhelming evidence that current account reversals had 
negative consequences for the aggregate growth of income per capita in the core 
or periphery. (Although many reversals involved serious crises that surely did 
have major distributional impacts.) 
o  Moreover, we are able to test some modern hypotheses with the historical data in 
ways that have not previously been done. We assess whether openness to 
international trade, financial and institutional development and currency 
mismatches played a role in adjustment. 
o  We find little evidence that currency mismatches, openness to international trade 
or the level of institutional and financial sophistication (proxied very roughly by 
higher income per capita) altered the severity of output losses associated with 
reversals in the nineteenth century. 
o  Nevertheless we do find some evidence that core Western European countries and 
the offshoots had lower growth losses in the adjustment process. Some countries 
even managed to see income rising in the face of reversals because previous 
investment was so productive. This offsets the negative growth experiences of 
other countries in the periphery leading to the finding that current account 
reversals were not systematically associated with output losses in this period. 
  5  
Minimizing Adjustment: Are We Losing Our Marbles? 
As has been noted frequently in current and past debates, some countries may enjoy a 
special “privilege”—an excess return on assets relative to liabilities—allowing them to 
sustain larger trade deficits in equilibrium. For example, if all borrowing occurs at a 
constant world interest rate, then, absent default or other forms of capital gains, the long 
run budget constraint would require a net debtor like the U.S. to run future surpluses to 
extinguish the debt, requiring a large trade balance improvement. But if a debtor can earn 
investment income surpluses even as a net debtor, as the U.S. has, then the required 
degree of trade balance adjustment is mitigated. 
Of course, this kind of scenario can cause umbrage among the creditors: creditors 
in the rest of the world are “winners” in a mercantilist sense (they run persistent net trade 
surpluses) but gain nothing from it as they give back (as net investment income flows) 
their “marbles” to the “loser,” in Jacques Rueff’s memorable terminology. Rueff and his 
colleagues were bothered by the U.S. ability to use this strategy during the Bretton 
Woods era (Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant 1966). French irritation found expression 
in Valery Giscard d’Eistang’s much-misattributed reference to “exorbitant privilege” 
(Gourinchas and Rey forthcoming). 
  Why do these seemingly esoteric debates over return differentials matter so 
much? The differentials may seem small at first, and their contribution to overall flows 
rather minimal, but it turns out that even small changes in the assumptions about the 
future path of these differentials can be the difference between seemingly manageable 
and seemingly disastrous paths of future national indebtedness. Or, put another way, they 
can be the difference between a scenario in which drastic adjustment is needed, and one 
where only a minor correction is required. How can small differentials make such a big 
difference? The reason is simple—compounding small differences for a long time can 
make a huge difference to outcomes further down the road. 
  In pioneering contributions, Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2003, 2004, 2005ab), 
confronted the important question as to how external wealth evolves and how adjustment 
takes place. Their data since the 1970s provides important evidence on this subject, and 
an even longer run perspective on the postwar U.S. experience will be afforded by the 
soon-to-be released data of Gourinchas and Rey (forthcoming). More recently, as global 
imbalances have grown, a wave of policy analysis has followed these leads and has 
focused on the trends evident in the U.S. balance of payments. For example, in a 
comparative study of several models that project future imbalances and U.S. external 
wealth, we find the following (Kitchen 2006, Table 1; based on Roubini and Setser 2004; 
Higgins et al. 2005; Cline 2005): 
 
o  In “optimistic” scenarios where the U.S. continues to enjoy favorable differentials 
in its favor with respect to income yields on FDI (500 basis points) and capital 
gains on all forms of external wealth (200 basis points), then by 2016 the U.S. net 
international investment position is likely to have a net debt in the range of minus 
40% to minus 60% of GDP, with an income balance between –1.5% and +0.2% 
of GDP. The current account might then be about –4% to –5% of GDP. 
 
o  In “pessimistic” scenarios, all else equal, where privilege disappears and these 
differentials vanish, the U.S. may end up with an external position in excess of – 6  
100% of GDP, and an income balance between –3% and –7.2%. The current 
account might then be about –10% to –15% of GDP. 
 
The range of these estimates depends on various other assumptions in the models studied, 
such as the speed at which the trade balance improves, and they assume that all 
imbalances are accommodated by financing from the rest of the world. Still, the numbers 
are illustrative only, and the point is this: whether privileges persist or not will make a big 
difference to outcomes in the future, having the potential to double or triple our net debt 
position and our income payments to the rest of the world in ten years’ time. 
So privileges are worth worrying about, and the realization that they may prove 
ephemeral is increasingly a cause for concern. Despite past trends, Geithner (2006) warns 
that “nevertheless, going forward, the scope for positive net factor payments from abroad 
and sizeable valuation effects is limited”. Should we worry? Or, to reframe the question 
as Rueff might have said: will the United States lose its marbles? For suggestive 
evidence, we compare past and present experience. 
Measuring Privilege 
We examine four ways of thinking about “privilege.” Suppose a country has external 
assets  A, external liabilities L, and a net foreign asset position NFA = A − L (all at the 
end of the previous year). In the current year, the country can earn an investment income 
flow that exceeds what would be predicted based on the world average rate of yield r if 
its rate of yield on assets is higher (rA > r) or its rate of yield on liabilities lower (rL < r) 
than the world average, implying that net property income from abroad (NPIA) is 
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The term in brackets represents the yield privilege, measured as a fraction of GDP (say, 
in percent). It arises whenever there is a privilege in the form of rate of yields, that is 
whenever rA > r or rL < r. 
  These yield privileges matter because they affect a country’s wealth in the long 
run, and hence the adjustments necessary to satisfy the long run budget constraint. They  7  
show up in the current account CA since they are part of NPIA, which is one component 
of NFIA or net factor income from abroad (the so-called income account).
 3 
As an accounting identity, the change in external wealth W can be disaggregated 
into earnings on the trade balance TB, plus unilateral transfers NUT, plus net labor 
income from abroad NLIA, plus net property income from abroad NPIA, plus capital 
gains KG. The last two items can then be thought of as the total returns on external 
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where r denotes yields, γ denotes capital gains and ρ denotes total returns (whether for 
assets and liabilities, as indicated by subscripts). 
Thus, setting aside the first three BOP items in the last equation (or treating them as 
exogenous), the evolution of external wealth is critically affected by the total rates of 
return (rates of yield plus rates of capital gains) on assets and liabilities. The higher are 
the “privileges” (in yields or capital gains), the larger is the deficit that can be run on the 
trade balance in the long run, all else equal—and, hence, the smaller is the adjustment 
needed for a country that is temporarily running a trade deficit at a larger non-sustainable 
level. 
We can use many approaches to explore these effects. Several have been proposed in 
the extant literature. All of these approaches are closely related to one another, so we 
need to pause and take stock. 
1.  Naive comparison of income flow and asset position. This is a simple way to 
illustrate privilege. Following equation (1) we can do a simple bivariate 
regression of y=NPIA/GDP on x=NFA/GDP. The slope is an estimate of r and the 
intercept an estimate of the yield privilege term in brackets. The relationship can 
also be seen using an x-y scatterplot. Creditors with interest receipts sit in the 
positive quadrant; debtors with payments in the negative quadrant; in the other 
quadrants we find the paradoxical cases of debtors with receipts and creditors 
making payments. If an observation sits well above (or below) the diagonal with 
slope  r through the origin, then we can say the country has a privilege (or 
penalty). We use this method as a simple descriptive tool in this paper, since the 
relevant data are widely available for past and present periods.
4 This method 
                                                 
3 Due to data restrictions, as a first approximation, we shall sometimes treat net labor income from abroad 
NLIA as zero, in which case NPIA equals total net factor income from abroad, NFIA; this is necessary 
when using contemporary IFS data (which do not present separate data on labor income remittances). 
4 This method assumes the income balance data are reliable, although there are two concerns that for the 
U.S. these data may be biased by artificially high receipts (due to tax shifting to overseas affiliates) and  8  
makes certain assumptions that may not hold: the intercept need not be constant 
and changes over time might be detectable either due to changes in the balance 
sheet (A and L) or in the yield differentials. A fixed intercept only measures the 
“average” privilege. The slope may also change, for example, if there are changes 
in inflation, since the slope is a nominal not a real yield. 
2.  Direct calculation of privilege. Compute rates of yield directly. The rate of yield 
on assets equals investment income credits (from BOP data) divided by total 
assets (from NIIP data). The rate of yield on liabilities equals investment income 
debits (from BOP data) divided by total liabilities (from NIIP data).
5 This method 
can be applied to disaggregated asset classes when disaggregated data on income 
flows and positions are available. For example, disaggregation shows that the 
current U.S. yield privilege is driven by FDI yield differentials (Higgins et al. 
2005). This method can also be extended to include capital gains when capital 
gains data are available. A leading example is Kitchen (2006) using current U.S. 
data. He finds a large total return privilege in recent years, partly due to yields and 
partly due to capital gains of unidentifiable origin. The method cannot be applied 
historically in the aggregate because gross position data are not available for the 
past; however, microeconomic data do permit some comparisons. 
3.  Indirect calculation of privilege. Ignore reported income flow data and use market 
data to compute returns for synthetic portfolios. These should match actual 
portfolios as closely as possible, e.g. by using portfolio-weighted stock market 
data. This method does not suffer, then, from errors in investment flow data (e.g., 
the accrual basis used for interest flows; Buiter 2006). It should also avoid 
problems of underreporting of investment income (the likely major source of the 
global current account deficit). However, it also relies on assumptions that the 
weights are correct and that returns and valuation changes derived from stock and 
bond indices track those of the actual portfolio. The most fragile calculations are 
the imputations of returns to FDI (especially privately held companies). Subject to 
these caveats, and after a lot of work, imputed yields and imputed capital gains on 
synthetic asset and liability positions can be estimated. A leading example is 
Gourinchas and Rey (forthcoming), who find that the U.S. has enjoyed large and 
growing privilege in total returns since the 1950s. Some of this is due to a 
growing return differential in all asset classes, and some is due to a composition 
shift toward higher return (risky) assets. 
                                                                                                                                                 
artificially low payments (due to underreporting of income on foreign FDI in the U.S.). The first point need 
not be an issue for adjustment if this is achieved via transfer pricing, since there is then an offsetting item in 
the trade balance, as noted by Philip Lane and others; the second point may be an issue, since the U.S. 
income position is likely being misreported, as noted by Daniel Gros and others (see 
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/setser/). Admittedly there may be other biases in the income balance. 
Globally, IFS data for 2003 show the world has a deficit on trade of 1.6% of reported imports (if this is 
underreporting on the import side it is likely trade tax evasion), but the deficit on the income balance is 
6.8% of reported credits, suggesting a bigger problem with underreported foreign income. If such a bias 
applied to the U.S. in 2004, it would add about $25 billion to U.S. NFIA, a rough doubling. 
5 As with the previous method, this method assumes the income flow data are correct. But it also requires 
that the position data be correct, and here there is even greater controversy. Since NIIP data are usually 
built up from survey reports, the accuracy and consistency of the reporting is open to question. As we shall 
see later in this section, there are large changes in NIIP data from year to year that are simply not accounted 
for by financial flows, exchange rate changes, and price changes.  9  
4.  Privilege-Adjusted Net Foreign Asset Position Not a new concept: this is just a 
reworking of method 2. Instead of focusing on the return differentials, this method 
replaces the official (market value) measures of assets A and liabilities L, with 
adjusted measures  A
* and L
* so that under a uniform world rate of yield r the 
modified positions yield the actual income flows seen, that is, rAA = rA
* and 
rLL = rL
*. Hence, in cases of privilege, where rA > r or rL < r, external assets 
increase, and liabilities shrink,  A
* = rAA/r > A and L
* = rLL/r < L. This method 
can also be applied to disaggregated asset classes. This method does not consider 
capital gains (i.e., total returns), though in principle it could be extended in that 
way. This method was proposed by Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), who 
arbitrarily set r equal to 5%. They find that whereas the conventional NFA 
position of the U.S. has deteriorated, the adjusted NFA position, NFA* = A* - L* 
reveals virtually no change since the 1970s. Given that the FDI component 
contains all of the yield differential, inevitably it is in the FDI component that 
almost all of the adjustments occur en route to A* and L*. 
 
Due to a combination of theoretical and empirical concerns, none of these methods 
proves ideal in practice, but taken together they offer corroborating evidence when the 
underlying data are fragmentary.
6 
Some Simple Estimates of Privilege 
Following method 1, we begin with the simplest of comparative exercises. Looking 
across time and space, we see whether countries are able to earn more on the investment 
income account than would be predicted under an assumption of a uniform world real 
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which is the econometric analog of equation (1). 
For the time being we assume the slope is constant across any sample (we allow 
this to vary later); we also assume the intercept is constant over time, but we allow it to 
vary across countries. The slope is an estimate of r in equation (1) and the intercepts are 
estimates of a country’s “average” yield privilege as a fraction of GDP. 
                                                 
6 Method 4, the most recent to be proposed by Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), has probably attracted 
the most controversy of the four methods. Opinions are divided on the so-called “dark matter” hypothesis. 
It is uncontroversial that the adjusted NFA positions are nothing more than a different way of looking at 
yield privilege (as the formulae show, there is a direct mapping from yield differentials and gross positions 
to NFA*). What is still disputed is whether these differentials are an expression of unmeasured exports 
such as liquidity services, insurance services, or “know-how” (see, e.g. Buiter 2006; or Brad Setser's blog). 
Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006) do find a strong correlation between their “dark matter” measure (the 
gap between NFA* and NFA) and FDI, which is consistent with other research identifying FDI as the main 
source of yield differentials (Cline 2005; Higgins et al. 2005; Kitchen 2006). Disaggregation can illuminate 
the sources of differentials and how these change over time, but in this paper we look only at aggregate 
yield differentials and use the adjusted NFA positions solely for that purpose.  10 
Figure 1 shows a simple example of this method for the United States using data 
for 1981–2003. The slope is 2.3%, a measure of the rate of yield. The intercept is 0.5% of 
GDP, a sign that the U.S. enjoyed an average level of privilege equal to about 0.5% of 
GDP over two decades. The details of the corresponding regression (3) appear in Table 1, 
panel (a), column 1. The result is not surprising: since the mid 1980s the U.S. has been a 
net debtor but after two decades it has only just reached a position where the investment 
income balance is about to turn negative: the U.S. data points for this period sit in the 
paradoxical zone in the upper-left quadrant of the scatterplot. The points line up along the 
line of best fit. One way to see the extent of privilege is to plot the line of best fit and a 
parallel line through the origin. The vertical distance between the two equals the 
“privilege” or intercept which is worth on average 0.5% of GDP. 
Having noted the existence and extent of U.S. privilege, we focus on two 
comparative questions: Is this privilege unique by contemporary standards? And is it 
unique by historical standards? Some answers are shown in the remainder of Table 1 and 
in Figures 2 and 3. 
Most conjectures about the source of privilege tend to focus on certain 
characteristics of the privileged nation. Hegemony explanations tend to stress economic 
or military strength. Institutional “safe haven” explanations stress a country’s record of 
property rights (security from expropriation risk) and economic stability (security from 
inflation or other risks). Purely economic explanations would stress the special features 
of a country’s financial or investment sector to provide “know how” or other 
unobservable but valuable services. A country’s position as a financial center could also 
count in cases where concentration and size matter, for example, in the provision of 
market depth and liquidity. Reserve currency status also might matter. Where else but the 
U.S. might such privileges be detected? 
As a first step we think it natural to look at a group of other large, advanced 
countries: the G7. Table 1, column 3 reports regression (3) for the G7, including the U.S. 
Unreported results for the G7 excluding the U.S., and for each country individually yield 
qualitatively similar findings. Compared to column 1, the slope reveals a world rate of 
yield of 2.5%. But the intercepts are revealing. The U.S. again has a privilege, still 0.5% 
of GDP. So too do Japan and the United Kingdom.
7 France and Germany have intercepts 
that are slightly positive (0.2% of GDP) but not statistically significant. Canada and Italy 
have negative intercepts, a sign that they are paying penalties that are statistically 
significant, respectively, –2.5% and –0.8% of GDP. 
To illustrate these patterns Figure 2 shows a scatterplot using the same axes as 
Figure 1. A diagonal line through the origin is plotted with a slope equal to the estimated 
common value of r. For countries with a zero intercept, all points should sit on this line, 
which we might call the “neutral line” where there is neither penalty nor privilege. Points 
above this line correspond the privilege, those below to penalty, using our terminology. 
To permit comparison with Figure 1, the U.S. points in Figure 2 are picked out with an 
“x” symbol. All of the U.S. points sit in a zone well above the neutral line. Only a 
fraction of the non-U.S. points sit in that zone, and many are close to or below the 
diagonal. 
To add a little more detail to this description, panel (b) of Table 1 computes an 
indicator variable based on the regressions in panel (a). We compare the distance between 
                                                 
7 The existence of such a privilege for the U.K. was recently noted by Nickell (2006).  11 
each point and the “neutral line” and compare it to the standard deviation of the fitted 
value. If the point is 2 standard deviations or more above the neutral line we label this 
country-year observation as being in the privilege zone; if it is 2 standard deviations 
below we label it as in the penalty zone.
8 
Columns 1 and 3 confirm that the U.S. has been in the privilege zone 100% of the 
time. In the rest of the G7, more time is spent in the neutral or penalty zone. Japan is 94% 
in the privilege zone, and the U.K. 76%. France and Germany are there 56% and 66% of 
the time, respectively, but also spend a nontrivial amount of time in the penalty zone. 
Canada and Italy spend 2/3 of their time in the penalty zone  
To sum up, among the G7, privilege can be often be found outside the U.S. in 
both Japan and the U.K. Although not hegemonic powers like the U.S., these two 
countries are both financial centers and issue important global currencies. 
What about historical precedents? Several conjectures in the current debate lead 
us to focus on the experience of Britain in the 1870–1913 period as a case study of 
privilege in the past. Britain was the hegemonic power of its time, held a global empire, 
and despite the rise of the U.S. and other competitors was still a leading industrial power. 
It was also, famously, a “banker to the world” before that term was gradually applied 
more to the U.S. as the years after 1914 went by. Sterling was the most important key 
currency of that time. How relevant is a U.S.-U.K. comparison for this paper? Many 
commentators have speculated on the similarities between the financial “privilege” that 
Britain enjoyed in the late nineteenth century and that of the United States in the postwar 
period, noting the ways in which this relaxed the British long-run budget constraint and 
eased adjustment; for example: 
 
...foreigners effectively giving Britain interest free loans by holding sterling and by 
sterling's enhancement of world liquidity...by analogy with the role of the U.S. dollar 
after 1945, the key currency system contained the seeds of its own destruction….British 
industry had to export less in order to buy a given quantity of imports than if sterling had 
not been a reserve currency….The adjustments of prices in the British economy and of 
the industrial structure, necessary to maintain a balance of payments equilibrium, were 
reduced….If Britain had been forced to adjust faster the structure of her industry, not 
only would the eventual adjustment have been less wrenching, but the rate of industrial 
growth in the late 19th century might have been higher. (Foreman Peck 1995, p. 168) 
 
So let us examine the empirical evidence for British privilege. Table 1, column 5 
repeats our regression analysis for the U.K. in the years 1870 to 1913, the so-called “age 
of high imperialism” when Britain rose to pre-eminence as the a center of global finance. 
The results are quite similar to those seen for the contemporary United States in column 
1. A slope of 4% represents the estimated rate of yield. An intercept of 0.6% of GDP 
suggests that the U.K. did enjoy some privilege. Panel (b) indicates that the U.K. was in 
the privilege zone 80% of the time, and otherwise in the neutral zone. The corresponding 
scatter appears in Figure 3. 
However, two key differences, and one similarity, stand out when comparing 
Britain then and the U.S. now. 
                                                 
8 The missing category, within 2 standard deviations of the diagonal is the neutral zone.  12 
First, as a fraction of GDP, British privilege was only marginally statistically 
significant (at the 10% level not the 5% level). 
Second, as is apparent from a brief glance at Figures 1 and 3, Britain was in a 
very different position to the U.S. today. Britain was a large net creditor: NFA was 
positive and increasing, and approaching 200% of GDP by period’s end. But today the 
U.S. is a large net debtor, with NFA falling below zero in the early 1980s and nearing –
30% of GDP today. The U.K. inhabited the “normal” upper-right quadrant in Figure 3, 
but the U.S. inhabited the “paradoxical” upper-left quadrant in Figure 1. 
Third, we note that the extent of the privilege enjoyed by the U.K. then and the 
U.S. now was quite volatile, measured as a fraction of GDP. Treating the privilege as the 
gap between the actual observed NFIA/GDP and that predicted by the fitted line 
constrained to pass through the origin, the implied measures of privilege are shown in 
Figure 4. Both figures show a distinct “W” shape. 
To use the terminology of Higgins et al. (2005), both of these countries have at 
times enjoyed a “series of fortunate events” taking the investment income balance far 
above trend in certain periods. In the early 1870s, U.K. returns were high after a loan 
boom, before a wave of crises and defaults hit emerging markets, and investment returns 
fell. The same pattern was witnessed in the 1890s, before and after the Baring crash. This 
highlights the possibility of recurring “peso problems” (Buiter 2005): risky foreign assets 
may generate supranormal returns for a time, but the trends may not be sustained. 
In the case of the United States, some of the same factors are possibly at work, 
along with exchange rate effects. Net income yields were low during strong dollar 
periods (mid 1980s, late 1990s), and these were also times of default in many emerging 
market bonds. The recent uptick in privilege for the U.S. in 2000-03 echoes that for the 
U.K. in 1905–13. But if the clock had been stopped earlier in each case—1905 for U.K. 
and 2000 for U.S.—then an unmistakable downward trend in privilege would be evident. 
Before proceeding it should be noted that in the regressions reported so far we 
have been analyzing a nominal yield r based on the slope estimates in regression (3). 
Should nominal yields be stable? This is, for example, the implicit assumption of 
Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), who use a constant arbitrary 5% discount rate, that 
is, a “price-earnings” ratio of 20 for all assets. An alternative approach would recognize 
that r is a rate of nominal yield, and that it might fluctuate systematically with the rate of 
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If the Fisher effect holds for all assets and their yields, then the coefficient θ 
should equal unity. But this may not be the case in practice. If loans payments are tied to 
a floating rate of interest, the pass through of inflation to yields will depend on the speed 
of market adjustment and the accuracy of expectations. If fixed income yields are at a 
fixed interest rate, no change in yields will occur. In principle, this ought to be resolved 
by changes in the market value of the underlying debt, but from an empirical standpoint it 
is doubtful that all such loans and debts are properly revalued in the data. Thus, we do not 
impose a unity restriction on θ (for if we did, it would be rejected) when we estimate (4) 
in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 1, panel (a). The bottom line is unchanged, however. The  13 
measures of privilege by country are only slightly affected when this simple inflation 
adjustment is carried out, as all the findings based on columns 1, 3, and 5 are valid. 
The lesson from these simple calculations is that the U.S. enjoyment of privilege 
today is not unprecedented by contemporary standards. We even find evidence of an 
historical precedent in the case of Britain during the first age of globalization. In the 
following sections we look at some of the details that lie behind these simple 
comparisons, trying to understand what is and was going on in the past for the British 
case and in the present for the U.S. case (with the G7 still as a backdrop). 
Disappearing Privilege Then and Now? 
We first turn to the trend in privilege over time. The privilege term in (1) need not be 
constant, of course. Two factors operate to affect the size of this term. First, the 
differential between rates of yield on assets and liabilities: the bigger the rate of yield 
differential, the bigger the privilege term. Second, leverage: if there are yield 
differentials, they can be exploited by enlarging the size of the nation’s balance sheet, 
increasing A and/or L. 
The implication is that if a country faces declining yield differentials on its 
portfolio, then to preserve its privilege one of two things must happen. 
First, there might be a reweighting of the country’s asset and liability portfolios 
that raises aggregate differentials via composition effects. For example, if debt and fixed 
income assets yield less than equity or FDI, a country will earn more if it sells foreigners 
less high yield home equity and more low yield home debt. A country also earns more if 
it purchases more high yield foreign equity and less low yield debt. It has been suggested, 
for example, that recent political maneuvers to block foreign takeovers in a number of 
countries could reflect, in part, this sort of concern. 
Second, an increase leverage may occur which helps offset a fall in differentials. 
For example, if the yield differentials are cut in half, then the same amount of investment 
income can be attained by doubling the size of the national balance sheet, that is by 
doubling A and L. 
These two kinds of responses would show up in macroeconomic aggregates but 
would be a manifestation of microeconomic decisions by investors. Either way, each 
investor, and in aggregate the country, takes on more risk, either by engaging in a quest 
for yield or by ramping up leverage. 
  The interplay between these two forces could be of importance both in the past 
and the present. For example, we will show below that rate of yield differentials appear to 
have shrunk for the two hegemons in the periods we study: Britain 1870–1913 and U.S. 
in the postwar period. This appears to have been true in the aggregate portfolios, even 
allowing for the fact that both countries, in the search for yield, are thought to have 
reweighted their portfolios toward riskier and higher yielding equity assets over time. 
In Table 2 we repeat the analysis of Table 1 for the U.S. now and the U.K. then 
but include an “early” indicator to test for an early period of “high privilege” in the 
sample (pre-1880 and pre-1992). We find evidence that U.K. and U.S. privilege, as a 
fraction of GDP, was much higher in the early years compared to the late years. For the 
U.K., privilege was 0.9% (of GDP) higher pre-1890, a difference significant at the 1% 
level. For the U.S. privilege was 0.2% higher pre-1992, but the difference is of borderline  14 
significance using a 10% (two-tailed) test. These results offer the first suggestion that 
yield privilege can be something difficult to sustain. What lies behind these results? 
  We begin with the historical example of the British. An important fact to 
remember is that we do not possess gross asset and liability positions for this period, so 
direct calculation of the privilege term in (1) and its components is not feasible, ruling out 
method 2. Instead we can turn to methods 3 and 4: look at market yield data on portfolio 
assets, or perform an adjusted NFA calculation. 
  We begin with the simpler adjusted NFA approach. We employ an arbitrary 4% 
discount rate (cf Table 1) and infer the British adjusted NFA position. To do this we take 
the net investment income each year from 1870 to 1913, multiply by 25, and call this 
NFA*. We can compare this with NFA, the conventional measure of the net position 
derived by economic historians by accumulating the current account and adding it to 
some known absolute position data for a given benchmark year. 
  The result of this comparison is shown in Figure 5. We recall that Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger’s NFA* is not a new concept—it is just another way of expressing yield 
differentials and the privilege associated with them. By implication, if these privileges are 
big, then NFA* should deviate very significantly from NFA—in a positive direction for a 
privileged country, and in a negative direction for a penalized country.
9  
  In contrast to recent U.S. experience, Figure 5 shows no evidence of any 
substantial deviations from 1870 to 1913. The two measures NFA* and NFA track each 
other very closely. Given the isomorphism between yield differentials and the size of the 
NFA adjustment, this finding gives an indirect test of the presence of yield differentials in 
the British case. Minimal or nonexistent differences between NFA and NFA* imply 
minimal or nonexistent British yield privilege. 
  Should we believe an indirect test? One reason for doubt is that the source data 
for the British investment income data series is rather conjectural. Imlah (1958, pp. 59–
64) had no records on actual investment income flows and instead imputed annual U.K. 
NFIA based on estimates—some might say educated guesses—about the rate of return on 
the British overseas portfolio. The rate was then applied to an estimate of the British NFA 
position, which was equally fragile, not least because it depended in part on cumulated 
NFIA as an element in cumulated CA (Imlah 1958, pp. 64–81). In other words, in the 
above calculations, all the indirect method does is reveal what Imlah thought the British 
rate of return on external assets was doing from year to year. 
To probe further, we might like to get additional and more precise direct or 
indirect evidence on yields. Unfortunately, the direct method is impossible in the 
aggregate data, as noted, so the best hope right now is the indirect method 3. However, 
data limitations mean we cannot replicate Gourinchas and Rey (forthcoming) until we 
have yield and position data for the British portfolios or at least a large share of them. But 
fortunately we do have some more recent yield measures that ought to be more accurate 
than the Imlah (1958) conjectured yields. 
                                                 
9 For example, when Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005) find that the U.S. path for NFA* is level whilst 
the path for NFA plunges precipitously, they are merely restating in a different metric what Gourinchas and 
Rey (2005) called the “famous observation that the large increase in U.S. net liabilities to the rest of the 
world has not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in net income payments”; that is to say, 
investment income balances have not lined up with the net asset position, so the privilege “intercept” is 
positive in (1), as in Figure 1.  15 
Realized rates of profit for a sample of British companies at home and abroad 
were computed by Davis and Huttenback (1986). Figure 6 summarizes their important 
findings for the 1870 to 1913 period. In the early years, Britain enjoyed very high returns 
on its overseas investments, notably its investments in the Empire, something the authors 
attribute to Britain’s role as a “pioneer” in the business of foreign investment in the 1870s 
and 1880s. However, these high returns soon evaporated. By 1900 and later, foreign 
nonempire investment, empire investments and domestic investments were all showing 
similar rates of yield.
10 
Concerning government debt, we know that ex ante yields experienced dramatic 
convergence from 1870 to 1913, as shown in Figure 7. We recall again the “peso 
problem”; ex post yields were surely never so high and some of this convergence was 
probably due to the diminution of risk premia. We might expect ex post returns to have 
converged rather less. 
  From this fragmentary evidence—the lack of privilege suggested by the adjusted 
NFA calculation and the suggestive evidence on yield differentials—we might conclude 
that the British faced declining yield differentials even when at the heights of their 
economic and military power, and even when London stood as the world’s undisputed 
financial center, a locus of investment “know how,” and an unimpeachable “safe haven.” 
True, the British did expand their balance sheet dramatically (as we saw in Figure 3), and 
they did shift to more risky assets in the private sector and in nonempire emerging 
markets as time went by. But apparently this was not enough to deliver a strong and 
persistent measure of privilege relative to GDP: as we saw in Table 1, the British 
intercept was positive but only of weak statistical significance. 
  One theme that must be re-emphasized throughout this paper is that naive 
extrapolation from the past is ill advised, whether the past is the last 20 years or the 
period 1870–1913. Still, the British experience in the late nineteenth century cautions 
against ever assuming that privilege is automatically perpetuated. Perhaps the British did 
have some initial advantages in the 1870s and 1880s that delivered privilege. But this did 
not last. Other countries like France, Germany and later the U.S. entered the fray to 
compete with Britain in overseas investment, and the British share of world overseas 
assets shrank from 78% to 50% from 1855 to 1914 (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). Britain 
may have lost its “pioneer” advantages in some markets and in other countries risk 
premia may have fallen as the institutional environment improved. 
  With those cautionary words in mind we turn to the U.S. experience since the 
1960s. Now, the direct method 2 is feasible and we need not beat about the bush with 
indirect evidence. Figure 8 illustrates the bottom line regarding rates of yield using BEA 
data. Rates of yield on assets and liabilities (in nominal dollar terms) obviously peaked in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s as inflation reached its postwar peak. But the important 
issue for us is not the level of these rates of yield, but the differential—which, 
fortunately, is naturally purged of any effects of inflation. 
The yield differential appears at the bottom of Figure 8. Its trend is unmistakably 
downward. We can also see that U.S. yield differentials tend to rise and fall in line with 
the strength of the dollar: the dollar value of yields on overseas assets tends to be low 
(relative to the yield paid on liabilities) when the dollar is strong. In the mid 1980s and 
                                                 
10 As explained, Davis and Huttenback (1986, 84), these measures do not include capital gains, so in this 
context they are termed rates of yield, in contrast to rates of total return that include capital gains.  16 
again in the mid 1990s the U.S. yield differential is low. This is not surprising, when 
there are deviations from PPP in the short run. A good deal of foreign investment income 
is denominated in local currency, and its dollar value will be depressed when the dollar is 
strong. 
Figure 8 helps us understand the indignant stance of the French in the 1960s: at 
that time the U.S. yield differential was a whopping 3% or 300bps. Since 1975 it has 
barely risen above 2%. Since 1995, it has averaged about 1.5%, reaching a low of under 
1% or 100bps in 1999. Over this period the rate of yield privilege has fallen by about 
200bps. Many fewer marbles are being returned these days, compared to how the game 
was played under Bretton Woods.
11 
Table 3 and Figure 9 shows how the U.S. stacks up against the rest of the G7 
where the yield differential is computed from 1981 onwards using a dataset that is 
comparable across countries.
12 Table 3 shows that among the G7 countries, the U.S. has 
enjoyed a large and statistically significant rate of yield differential of about 167 basis 
points on average. But two other countries have enjoyed positive and significant yield 
differentials: Japan (112 bps) and, ironically, France (80 bps). Italy (–52 bps) and Canada 
(–139 bps) have had adverse rate of yield differentials.
13 
Figure 9 exposes the volatility of this differential over time and also reveals a 
trend: the U.S. began with quite high levels of privilege relative to the rest of the G7 
(where on average, differentials have been about zero), but the trend over time has been 
an inexorable convergence of the U.S. yield differential towards zero. Regression 
analysis confirms that the U.S. yield differential has a negative and statistically 
significant time trend (in the G7, only the U.K. has enjoyed a positive and statistically 
significant time trend in this differential). Again, as in Figure 8, we see that the U.S. yield 
differential has been declining, with this trend only abating in periods when the dollar is 
weak. 
Only time will tell, but the recent uptick in the differential in 2000–03 is the 
source of much controversy. A longer run perspective seems to indicate that although that 
uptick is there, the longer run trend is one of vanishing yield differentials or disappearing 
privilege, just as in the British case a century before. 
Maintaining Privilege via Leverage? 
At the start of this section we showed that the U.S. has managed to maintain a nontrivial 
“privilege” that has averaged about 0.5% of GDP over the last two decades. Close 
scrutiny of Figure 1 suggests that, relative to the fitted values, privilege relative to GDP 
has been fairly stable over the years, with a slight upward blip evident in the years after 
the millennium (the points furthest to the left on the scatterplot). This blip is largely 
driven by the aforementioned uptick in yield differentials observed in 2000–03. 
                                                 
11 Another way of looking at this is to note that at the end of the period the nominal yield on assets was 4%, 
and that on liabilities 3%, which matches the ratio of 1.3 computed by Gourinchas and Rey (2005); but 
back in the 1960s, a time of comparable low inflation, the figures were about 3% and 6%, a ratio of 2. 
12 We use the IMF IFS for investment income data proxied by NFIA, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) 
for data on external positions. 
13 There may be other countries outside the G7 that have enjoyed a yield privilege in recent times. For 
example, in an analysis of uncovered interest parity, Switzerland appears to have had a systematic negative 
risk premium with respect to OECD countries (Kugler and Weder 2005).  17 
  Yet, notwithstanding a couple of such blips, we have also seen that over time U.S. 
yield differentials followed a downward trend since 1981. So, looking at equation (1), we 
reach the immediate conclusion that the U.S. has only been able to maintain its privilege 
as a fraction of GDP by raising its leverage to offset the diminution in yield differentials. 
  Figure 10 explores this mechanism further. Using BEA and U.S. Historical 
Statistics data back to the 1960s, we examine the actual path of the yield privilege as a 
fraction of GDP, and its counterfactual path under the assumption that rate of yield 
differentials had been constant at their average 1960s values throughout the period (about 
300bps). In the counterfactual, differentials would thus be much higher in later years than 
was actually seen.
14 
  Figure 10 shows what we would expect. We know the U.S. has been increasing its 
leverage dramatically since the 1960s. If the U.S. balance sheets had expanded thus with 
constant 1960s average yield differentials over the entire  period, then in 2003 the 
privilege, rather than being about 1% of GDP would have been about 2%. Put another 
way, if leverage massively increases over several decades then it is not that reassuring 
when we find privilege merely holding steady as a fraction of GDP (Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger 2005). If yield differentials—the ultimate basis of the privilege— were 
stable, then privilege ought to have exploded relative to GDP, counterfactually, as in 
Figure 10. The reason they didn’t is that the yield differentials are narrowing. From this 
perspective, U.S. privilege is disappearing. 
When we focus on this trend, subject to the caveat about naive extrapolation, the 
outlook is surely less rosy, for two reasons. First, if the differential keeps shrinking, then 
astronomic and implausible explosions in leverage would be needed to maintain privilege 
at its current level as a fraction of GDP; if the differential reaches zero, privilege will 
vanish. Second, the 2000–03 blip may or may not be sustainable, and some or all of it is 
due to transitory effects—overseas earnings are boosted by a weakening dollar, there has 
been a tax amnesty, there have been low interest rates on debt liabilities, and so on 
(Higgins et al. 2005). 
One might add a third observation. Correlation does not imply causation, but this 
shrinkage in the yield differential obviously does coincide with the United States sliding 
from a net creditor position to a net debtor position, as shown in Figure 12. If there is a 
causal link here, and differentials shrink as net debt increases, then a Laffer curve type of 
argument tells us that at some point the U.S. will reach (or may already have reached) a 
point of maximum privilege relative to GDP. 
Capital Gains 
The main focus so far has been on the yield differentials that underpin privilege in 
equation (1). However, the evolution of wealth is also affected by capital gains, as seen in 
equation (2). So even if a country suffers a decline in yield differentials it might be of no 
consequence for the long run budget constraint if it is offset by an increase in the capital 
gain differential; thus adjustment may be avoided if capital gains offset any change in 
yields. 
The evidence on capital gains is even more fragile and fragmentary than that on 
investment income yields, but we make a few observations. Using indirect measures of 
                                                 
14 For the purposes of the counterfactual, we attribute 50% of the difference in the yield differential to the 
yield on assets, and 50% to the yield on liabilities.  18 
total returns, Gourinchas and Rey (forthcoming) find evidence that U.S. total return 
differentials (for assets minus liabilities) may have grown in the post Bretton Woods 
period as compared to the Bretton Woods period. Given that the total return differential 
equals the yield differential plus the capital gain differential, this says the capital gain 
differentials must have grown enormously, since we know from the above that yield 
differentials  have shrunk. If anything, the U.S. had a “penalty” on the capital gains 
differential in the Bretton Woods era, averaging about –2% of GDP. Then, once the 
floating rate period began, the U.S. enjoyed positive valuation effects. It is tempting to 
infer that it was the breakdown of the dollar standard—and the ability of the U.S. to reap 
exchange-rate driven capital gains—that caused this shift. But as we shall see in a 
moment, the exchange rate channel seems weak. The data show that capital gains on 
external wealth moved in favor of the U.S. in every year until the turn of the millennium, 
at the height of the U.S. stock market. Capital gains were then zero or negative for 
several quarters. 
Another perspective is presented by Kitchen (2006). He examined trends only 
since 1989 using direct BEA measures, and in that shorter window no firm time trends 
emerge, leading him to conclude that a positive 2% rate of capital gain differential in 
favor of the U.S. is the norm in recent years. 
  We would raise two questions here. First, if this differential is flat, will it offset a 
declining yield differential trend, should that continue? Obviously the answer is no, even 
if such a constant differential can be assumed to continue. Second, where are these capital 
gains coming from? This turns out to be a dark secret. Kitchen (2006) relates how the 
BEA classifies valuation effects as arising from three factors. First, “prices” (meaning 
changes in prices of assets in the currency of denomination). Second, “exchange rates” 
(this barely affects liabilities, but reflects changes in the dollar values of nondollar assets 
due to changes in currency values). Finally, “other.” 
It turns out that since 1989 the price component of capital gains has delivered a 
rate of return of about 1.5% on both external assets and liabilities: no differential there. 
Exchange rate changes have been zero on average (but large in some years). On average, 
the positive differential in the rate of capital gains on assets versus liabilities has been 
entirely due to the final mysterious “other” category: about 100bps on assets and 100bps 
on liabilities (with both in favor of the U.S. for a total differential of 200bps). What is 
“other”? Apparently “discussions with BEA staff indicate that the source of much of this 
‘other’ valuation change is simply unidentified” (Kitchen 2006, 16), prompting Cline 
(2005) to call these gains “statistical ‘manna from heaven.’” This inability to account for 
the source of the capital gains is quite worrying. We ought to feel slightly uneasy if we 
cannot really understand these gains, and we should feel very uneasy about the idea of 
extrapolating something we cannot understand.
15 
  Notwithstanding the mystery surrounding the source capital gains, have they been 
enough to offset the declining U.S. yield differential? Table 4 and Figure 11 show that 
                                                 
15 One possible source of these mysterious gains is simply mismeasurement. For example, the statistical 
discrepancy in the balance of payments is often quite large. As an accounting principle, it appears routine to 
fold this discrepancy into financial account (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004; Nickell 2006). This 
accounting implicitly treats the current account side as the fully reliable measure. In practice, this 
distribution of the error is unlikely to be correct. Since valuation effects are simply the difference between 
reported external wealth changes and (minus) the financial account, falsely attributing a part of the 
statistical discrepancy to the financial account will bias the measure of capital gains.  19 
they have. These figures repeat the format of Table 3 and Figure 8, but show total rate of 
return differentials for the G7, not just rate of yield differentials. The difference is just 
capital gains, and since the capital gains are a volatile measure (partly accounted for by 
nature, partly due to measurement error) these data have much higher variance. The 
bottom line is that switching to total rates of return places the U.S. in a unique position as 
the only privileged country among the G7. 
Table 4 shows that among the G7 countries, the U.S. has enjoyed a large and 
statistically significant rate of total return differential of about 370 basis points on 
average.
16 Of the U.S. total return differential, we have already seen that about 167 bps 
was due to yields, so the remaining 203 bps is due to capital gains.
17 On average these 
two parts of the differential have played an almost equal role. But the trends of the two 
components are obviously different. The trend in the total return differential is flat (which 
is confirmed by regression analysis). But because Figure 8 showed that the rate of yield 
differential was closing, the result here implies that differential in the rate of capital gains 
must be widening. 
  It would be interesting to see how trends in capital gains (or total returns) evolved 
in the past for the case of Britain from 1870 and 1913. Unfortunately, limitations of the 
current historical macroeconomic data preclude any calculation of gross valuation effects 
with even the limited degree of precision we accept today. Imlah (1958, pp. 59–81) 
ignored capital gains entirely, and assumed that gains and losses roughly cancelled out. 
However, as with our earlier discussion of yields, we can make use of some more recent 
data based on samples of traded securities. 
Edelstein (1982) has computed total returns for home and foreign portfolios of 
equity and debenture assets in the U.K. portfolio in the late nineteenth century. The 
summary data in Figure 12 suggest no discernible trend movement in the differential 
between home and foreign assets. Indeed, a noticeable differential is apparent only for 
debentures (including both government and private bonds and debt), suggesting that even 
as ex ante differentials converged ex post differentials were rather steady. 
There is suggestive evidence here that Britain then, like the United States now, 
made a transition from “banker” to “venture capitalist” mode whereby returns to 
investors increasingly took the form of capital gains rather than yields. So the “good 
news” from the past for the U.S. position today is that such a transition is possible, 
although worryingly the U.S. data are provide us with no comprehension of where these 
gains originate. The “bad news” is that U.K. return differentials were quite volatile in the 
long run—a decade or so of large positive differentials can be followed by another 
decade with a large negative differential. Naive trend extrapolation is unwise. 
Summary: Privilege has its Memberships 
The United States has gradually become the world’s largest debtor and the world’s 
largest creditor over the last half century. Over that same period, official data show that 
the U.S. has earned higher yields (and higher total returns) on its external assets than the 
rest of the world has earned on U.S. external liabilities. Yet the rate of yield differential 
                                                 
16 For all other countries, zero is within the 95% confidence interval, and mean total return differential 
range between at most +25 bps (U.K.) and –62 bps (Germany). 
17 This is presumably driven by those “other” capital gains identified by Kitchen (2006), who found a very 
similar 210 bps differential.  20 
has fallen, from 300bps in the early 1960s to maybe 150bps today. And if some of that 
remaining 150bps is due to understated income payments to foreigners, the gap today 
could in reality be nearing zero (Gros 2006). 
It appears that expanding leverage has offset diminishing yield differentials to 
prop up “privilege” as a fraction of GDP. Yet the future extrapolation of this trend is 
doubtful: the net external position cannot trend up forever, and if the yield differential 
continues to trend down, no amount of leverage will help. At the present time a 
significant contribution from ill-defined capital gains is keeping up the U.S. measures of 
privilege, and more research will be required to verify and identify these mysterious 
additions to U.S. external wealth. 
  A century ago, Britain enjoyed a similar hegemonic position—economically as 
well as geopolitically. Britain also appeared to enjoy some modest privilege at times. But 
this privilege could not be sustained, even from a massive net credit position. 
International financial competition, the global quest for yield, and the maturing of 
emerging markets all put a squeeze on British privilege. Similar forces are at work today 
In both eras the hegemons possibly gained privilege during the “pioneer” phase of 
globalization, but for the British at least, holding on to privilege proved elusive. 
  As privilege shrinks from, say, 2% of GDP to 1% or to zero, this enlarges yet 
further the adjustment needed to bring a high trade deficit to a long run sustainable level. 
With the trade deficit around 6% of GDP, the adjustment grows from 4% to 5% to 6%, 
given near balance on the income account. 
Making Adjustment: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly 
The second part of this paper examines the implications of large adjustments to the 
external balances, again with an eye to history. 
Data and Methodology 
We use a panel data set for over 20 countries between 1880 and 1913 to address the 
questions posed above. Our data comes from various sources including that used in recent 
work on crises by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martínez-Peria (2001) and 
subsequently updated by Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming). We also make use of the 
extensive data generated by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). Our data for current accounts 
comes from Jones and Obstfeld (2003). Data for the Netherlands come from Smits et al. 
(2000) and Chile from Braun et al. (2000). Where the Jones and Obstfeld data set did not 
have information available, we used the trade balance (exports minus imports) following 
previous studies such as Adalet and Eichengreen (forthcoming) and Catão and Solomou 
(2005).  
We define the core countries to include Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. These countries were high income countries with robust institutional 
features but which also imported a fair amount of capital during the period. France, 
Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, also in the core, are classified as a group of 
capital exporters and/or financial centers. Since surplus countries often had different 
experiences in adjustment, we leave these countries out of the core group when we 
analyze the adjustment process in detail. Furthermore we place Australia, Canada, New  21 
Zealand and the United States into an “offshoots” category. These regions were extensive 
capital importers, were settled by immigrants of European origins, and also had a special 
institutional heritage being members (or once having been members) of the British 
Empire. The periphery is defined to include Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Chile, 
Egypt, Finland, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, 
Uruguay.  We separate the world in this way because the periphery was on average 
poorer, less financially developed, had institutions that were less conducive to economic 
growth and relied extensively on external financing due to their low per capita incomes 
and deficient pools of domestic savings. At the same time, most of the periphery had 
floating exchange rate regimes for significant portions of the period and only a few spells 
being on a gold standard. At times we separate countries simply into the rich and poor. 
We define the rich countries to be those with an income per capita in 1913 higher than 
$2,892 which was the median level of per capita income in 1913. 
Current Account Evolution over Time 
In Figures 13 and 14 we illustrate the distribution of current account surpluses using box 
and whisker plots. These show the median, the 25
th and 75
th percentile and the key 
outliers at either end of the distribution. These also exhibit the adjacent values for each 
category of country.
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Figure 13 shows that the core had persistently higher surpluses although there are 
quite a few more outliers at each end of the distribution in the core. The offshoots have a 
skewed distribution. There are many more country years of deficit than of surplus in 
these regions. There are also fewer outliers than in the other two categories. The 
periphery seems to be much more bunched towards the middle as the outside values on 
the bottom end are far fewer in number. Figure 14, which separates countries by whether 
they are rich, an offshoot, or poor shows a similar picture. Rich countries again have a 
much more varied experience than either of the two other categories.  
Figures 15 through 17 move to a representation of the time series properties of 
current accounts in each group of countries. Figure 15 shows the unweighted average 
current account surplus in the core, offshoots and the periphery. Figure 16 divides the 
world into rich, offshoots and poor. It is clear that there is a strong inverse correlation 
between movements of the current account in the periphery and in the core. When 
surpluses in the core countries are high, the periphery tends to move into deficit. These 
cycles are well known in the historical literature and coincide with movements in the 
global and especially the British business cycle (cf. Fishlow 1986). In particular when 
British investment (usually in housing) was high, British capital stayed home and the 
trade balance in the periphery turned positive. As investment cooled in Britain, capital 
ventured abroad and allowed for significant increases in the current account deficits of 
peripheral nations.  
Downturns in the global economy (i.e., in Great Britain and the Western 
European core which made up the principal export markets for the periphery) coincide 
with increased current account deficits in the periphery as export markets fizzled.
19 
                                                 
18 These are found by calculating the upper and lower quartiles. Call them p75 and p25. The interquartile 
range iqr is then p75 - p25. The adjacent values are the highest value not greater than p75 + 3/2 iqr and the 
lowest value not less than p25 - 3/2 iqr 
19 However, Britain had a persistent trade surplus with India.  22 
Reversals from deficits to surpluses in the periphery are often associated with economic 
recovery in the core as capital flows emanating from the core dried up. But such reversals 
in this period tended to be largely healthy in the sense that they were the natural 
conclusion of a cycle whereby capital flowed into the less developed regions to fund 
infrastructure and other productive investment. When export markets ripened, exports 
were able to take off helping to repay obligations previously incurred and smooth the 
adjustment process. 
Figure 17 showing the weighted averages of current account deficits, brings out 
these co-movements even more clearly. Although weighting in this way should make it 
so that deficits and surpluses balance out this is not the case here. For most years a 
downward shift equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP would make it so that there was global 
balance. The reason this does not happen in the sample could be because of missing 
current account information for a small portion of the world’s total output. Nevertheless, 
this figure shows that the total surplus of the core or the total deficit of the periphery was 
not usually higher than one percent of GDP. This figure does however hide the large and 
persistent surpluses previously discussed in the case of Britain. 
Current Account Persistence 
Early work by Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim (1998) used AR (1) regressions of the 
current account and compared the past to the present. They found that current account 
imbalances were significantly more persistent in the past than they have been recently. 
Taylor (2002) ran separate regressions for 15 countries allowing for dynamic error 
correction. We generalize this by pooling the data and implementing the following type 
of vector error correction model  
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Our sample is slightly larger than that in Taylor (2002). Here, the country-specific 
βis represent the adjustment coefficients for each country in the sample. A small 
adjustment coefficient (in absolute value) implies that current accounts persist at levels 
far from their long-run values longer than for countries with larger absolute values. 
Figure 18 plots these coefficients and reveals an intuitive ranking. The first batch of 
countries (from right to left) include the financial centers like Britain, France, and 
Holland. In the next group of countries, we find the extensive capital importers that ran 
persistent deficits such as Australia, Canada, and the U.S. Their implied half-life for 
current account deficits is roughly three years. Countries further out on the periphery that 
tended to indulge in revenue financing on international capital markets or which were 
smaller and more susceptible to changes in the moods of the capital markets including 
Chile, Finland, Japan, Uruguay witnessed significantly faster adjustment. Their average 
coefficient of roughly –0.6 implies a half-life of roughly three-fourths of a year. The 
bottom line is that many important capital importers were in fact able to run highly 
persistent deficits and that surplus countries persistently ran current account surpluses. 
We also tested whether several country attributes might be associated with the 
observed persistence of current account deficits. Specifically we allowed the adjustment 
parameter to vary with the level of exports relative to output, the lagged level of output  23 
per capita and the level of the government’s currency mismatch. Countries with higher 
levels of exports for a given level of output (used as a proxy for the level of total trade to 
GDP) could be expected to have an easier time adjusting in the future and hence capital 
markets might be expected to “keep the money flowing” in the face of global shocks. On 
average such countries would be expected to run more persistent imbalances.  
A similar logic might be used for higher income per capita countries. At the same 
time, higher income per capita countries also attracted a higher share of British surplus 
capital because investment opportunities were better there. This division then attempts to 
control somewhat for differences between imbalances derived from development finance 
and those associated with stopgap external funding of frivolous government budget 
deficits. Fishlow (1986) made such a distinction and argued that the latter type of funding 
could quickly turn around as markets realized borrowing costs were growing more 
rapidly than revenue streams or the real economy. Fishlow also argued that development 
finance countries could bide their time in the face of export slow-downs by borrowing 
even more from the markets as their financial sustainability was not necessarily in doubt. 
Markets could be expected to fulfill their role here as profitability and revenue would be 
expected to be higher in the medium term. Similarly, if expectations of faster growth 
relative to world averages were strongest in the wealthy offshoots, their current account 
imbalances could be well justified. 
We also checked whether countries with a fixed exchange rate or currency 
mismatch problems on the aggregate balance sheet had any observable differences in 
persistence. The logic of including a control for whether the country had a gold standard 
or not is that flexible rates are typically argued to provide shock absorbers and thus 
equilibrate more quickly any potential imbalances through changes in the real exchange 
rate much faster. We define the currency mismatch for the economy to be the level of 
debt outstanding payable in foreign currency or in a fixed amount of gold specie minus 
the total reserves in the country normalized by the level of exports (cf. Bordo and 
Meissner forthcoming). Countries with larger mismatches could also face confidence 
problems, if in the event of a current account reversal, the real exchange rate depreciated 
making the real burden of repayment more difficult and hence repayment more risky.  
To control for all of these risk factors, we ran a regression similar to that above 
but included interaction terms between the lagged level of the current account and the 
lagged value of these various controls. If the interaction is found to be positive, it would 
suggest that the adjustment parameter would move towards zero and hence that such a 
variable made it easier to sustain current account imbalances. Table 5 shows that 
countries that have higher per capita output have more persistent imbalances. This is 
further evidence that the capital exporters and the rich offshoots ran more persistent 
imbalances. Results regarding the exchange rate regime seem inconclusive. The 
interaction effect is not highly statistically significant nor is the coefficient on the 
interaction term very large. This is also the case for the terms that interacted the lagged 
current account and openness to exports or the currency mismatch variable. 
 
Current Account Reversals 
We now turn to an analysis of the impact of current account reversals on short-run 
economic growth. Our preferred measure of a reversal is similar to that used in Sebastian  24 
Edwards (2004). We define a reversal to occur if in a given year the current account 
relative to GDP increases by more than four percentage points, and in the previous year 
the country was in deficit.  
Table 6 shows the incidence of these “four percent reversals”. Financial centers 
have no reversals in this period. Tabulations show that the core, excluding the financial 
centers, had twelve reversals accounting for 3.92 percent of the country year observations 
amongst this group. The periphery had 21 reversals, or 3.86 percent of the country-year 
observations within this group. So it would appear that outside of the financial centers 
Britain, Holland, France and Germany there is little difference between the raw frequency 
of reversals in the core or periphery. In rich countries, excluding the financial centers, the 
frequency of reversals is double that of the poor countries. In 5.6 percent of the country 
years there is a reversal in the rich countries while the number is 2.3 percent in poor 
countries. Together with the previous findings, this suggests that the distribution of 
reversals in rich countries might have been highly uneven.  
Table 7 shows the average levels of the current account relative to GDP in each of 
the three years before a reversal, the year of the reversal and the three following years. 
We obtain these coefficients from a regression of the ratio of the current account to GDP 
on three leads of the reversal indicator, the contemporaneous reversal indicator and three 
lags. Figure 19 shows how the average values of four different groups evolved over the 
cycle. The core and offshoots seem somewhat different from the periphery. The core 
countries run higher deficits than other types of countries. Besides this, there seems to be 
little significant difference between the various types of breakdowns we use. 
  We also checked more carefully whether once a reversal had occurred if it was 
sustained. The answer is for the most part yes. We say a reversal is sustained if three or 
five years after the reversal the current account surplus is still higher than the year 
immediately before the reversal. Out of 31 reversals, 27 exhibited a sustained turn around 
in this way three years after the event. After five years, four of the 29 country-year 
observations had witnessed a relapse. These statistics reveal that reversals were, if 
anything, more likely to be sustained in the past than in the last 30 years. Edwards (2004) 
found that between 68 and 83 percent of reversal episodes were sustained which is 
slightly lower than our findings. 
  Another interesting question concerns the relationship between financial crises 
and current account reversals. Edwards (2004) found that countries experiencing a 
current account reversal had a significantly greater probability of suffering a large change 
in the exchange rate (i.e., a currency crisis) than countries that did not have a reversal. 
The idea that currency crises or sharp changes in the exchange rate could be associated 
with current account reversals is intuitive. In a reversal, and ceteris paribus, the price at 
which domestic goods are exchanged for foreign goods must fall with the associated 
expenditure switching and reduction. If a reversal is associated with a sudden stop of 
capital inflows and reserves are depleted, then the nominal exchange rate could also fall 
for the reasons contemporary models of the exchange rate suggest. On the other hand, 
real depreciation via deflation might be a possibility especially in the gold standard 
period when many countries had fixed exchange rates under the gold standard. Bordo 
(2005) discusses how the price-specie flow mechanism operated and suggests that 
adjustment was often smooth in this period.  25 
In the rosiest of scenarios originally analyzed by Feis (1930) and later Fishlow 
(1986), current account reversals are relatively smooth. Early investments give rise to 
higher incomes which allow for increased savings. They are also a period in which earlier 
investments made using imported capital begin to pay off. Dividends reaped by the 
capital exporters from earlier investments are used to fund purchases of goods and 
services from yesterday’s capital importers. These proceeds are used to pay interest and 
principal on earlier debts incurred and the cycle repeats itself. The historical literature 
suggests that adjustment may have been more difficult in debtor countries that used 
external funding for “revenue” purposes than in regions that put funds towards further 
development of the economy and marketable exportables.  
In our data the majority of current account reversals are not associated with 
currency crises and banking crises.
20 For the handful of debt crises in our period, there 
are few reversals surrounding such events. There are no debt crises concurrent with a 
reversal. Greece had a reversal in the year before its 1894 debt default. Tabulations show 
that only three of the 33 reversals in our data set are associated with currency crises in the 
same year. These are Argentina in 1885, Chile in 1898 and Greece in 1885. The banking 
crises that have concurrent reversals are Australia in 1893, Chile in 1898 and Uruguay in 
1913.  
There is a possibility that this result is sensitive to the window of observation. So 
we created a five year window for each type of crisis. This indicator equals one if there 
was a currency, banking or debt crisis in the current year or within the previous two or 
next two years.  Measured this way, seven out of the 33 reversals are associated with the 
five year currency crisis window. Ten out of 33 reversals are associated with the five year 
banking crisis window. As it happens only two of the 33 reversals are associated with our 
five year window for debt crises.   
There does not seem to be overwhelming evidence of an association between 
crises and reversals in this period. This is particularly so for the richer countries that 
adhered credibly to the gold standard. Reversals such as those in Australia (1891), 
Belgium (1881), Denmark (1886), Finland (1893) and New Zealand (1893), to name a 
few, had no currency crisis associated with them. Most of these countries managed to 
hold on to their gold-based exchange rates despite suffering reversals and even banking 
crises. Periphery countries that financed deficits with external borrowing and had 
mismanaged currencies seem more susceptible to being served up crises along with 
reversals. This begs the question of what the connection is between the real exchange rate 
and movements in the current account. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) suggest that today a real effective depreciation of the 
dollar of over 30 percent would have to arise to allow for enough expenditure switching 
to rebalance recent U.S. trade deficits. Their model is an endowment economy and does 
not appear to allow for factors affecting economic growth. This conclusion would seem 
to bias the result in favor of large exchange rate swings.  
The historical literature is not conclusive on the subject. New research by Catão 
and Solomou (2005) argues that the elasticity of the trade balance (defined as the 
difference of the log of exports and the log of imports) with respect to the real effective 
exchange rate was roughly one. Their sample is for a group of 15 countries between 1870 
                                                 
20 We use crisis dates from Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martínez Peria (2001) that were slightly 
updated in Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming).  26 
and 1913. We examine this question slightly differently. We present regressions of the 
change in the logarithm of the real exchange rate (where the nominal exchange rate is 
local currency units per pound sterling) on the contemporary reversal indicator, three lags 
of the reversal indicator, and country fixed effects. The regression equation takes the 
following form: 
 
∆RERit = γ kCA_REVit+ j
j=1
j=3
∑ + γ kCA_REVit−k
k=0
k=3
∑ + µi + εit 
 
where CA_REV equals one when there is a current account reversal. Table 8 shows the 
short run coefficients for six different specifications. Column 1 pools the data while 
columns 2, 3, and 4 split the sample by core excluding the financial centers, offshoots and 
periphery. Columns 5 and 6 compare the experience of country-year observations on the 
gold standard and those off the gold standard. Figure 20 plots these coefficients. Figure 
21 plots the actual sample average and median change in the real exchange from three 
years before up to three years after a current account reversal. Overall there is some 
support consistent with the classical price-specie adjustment process. This is most easily 
seen in the plot of the median real exchange rates. Here we see mild appreciation in the 
run up to a reversal and mild depreciation after the reversal. 
Table 8 and our plots reveal that countries see real appreciation in the years that 
precede a reversal. The cumulative sum of all post-reversal coefficients is usually 
positive implying that mild depreciations on the order of two to eight percent are 
associated with the years following reversals. There is an appreciable difference between 
gold and non-gold countries. Reversals in the non-gold countries exhibit larger real 
depreciations after a few years. Deficits are associated with large appreciations that 
continue into the year of reversal. In gold standard countries, the concomitant 
depreciation seems much smoother and smaller over the years including and after the 
reversal. This contrasts with findings by Freund and Warnock (forthcoming) who looked 
at similar data between 1980 and 2003. They argued that the movement of the real 
exchange rate did not depend on whether the deficit was large or small. Our findings 
suggest that the offshoots, which ran the most persistent and highest deficits on average, 
had significantly smaller depreciations in the reversal period than the periphery and the 
floating countries. 
There are few coefficients on the reversal indicators that are individually 
statistically significant. However, tests of the hypothesis that the four coefficients are 
jointly significant show that the current and lagged values are together statistically 
significantly different from zero in most specifications except the pooled sample and for 
the gold standard country years. Our conclusion is that the process of adjustment 
associated with a reversal was associated with mild depreciation in both core and 
periphery and in gold versus non-gold countries. Many possible explanations for such a 
pattern exist that contrast with current findings. Stabilizing capital flows, rather than 
destabilizing speculative flows, and greater price flexibility allowed for smoother 
adjustment and fewer panics that resemble the first generation variety of currency crises. 
Finally, rising incomes associated with these large investments also seem to have helped 
ease the burden of adjustment so that aggregate demand changes were not associated with  27 
large price swings thus vindicating an Ohlinian view of the conventional transfer 
problem. 
Patterns of Reversals 
In this section we analyze the adjustment process in detail. Mechanically, current account 
adjustment must be associated with a rise in national savings relative to total investment. 
The route by which countries get to adjustment can vary quite significantly however. 
Countries with fiscal deficits could be forced to eliminate such deficits in the face of 
capital flow reversals. This could lead to sharp falls in output as consumption and 
investment decline. But not all current account deficits emanated from government 
deficits and often they reflected high investment in productive enterprises in excess of 
domestic savings. In such countries a burst of exports based on earlier investments could 
facilitate adjustment sometimes even offsetting the required reduction in consumption 
(consumers and government alike). This occurred as incomes expanded and financed the 
additional savings needed to improve the balance. Nevertheless, Edwards (2004), Adalet 
and Eichengreeen (forthcoming) and Freund and Warnock (forthcoming) suggest that 
reversals have been associated with growth slowdowns. These samples are either entirely 
from the post-1970 period or heavily weighted to describe events post-1913. Given what 
we have found above, and our reading of the historical literature, there is reason to 
believe that prior to 1913 the growth impact of reversals might not have been so 
pernicious. 
In what follows we attempt to see whether the various types of countries, which 
had very different reasons for their current account imbalances, had different adjustment 
paths. We have data for 15 countries on investment and savings, but the sample is larger 
when we look at the government surplus and expands appreciably more when we analyze 
the growth impact of reversals. 
  Table 9 shows how changes in the ratio of private savings to GDP are associated 
with changes in the current account. We regress the savings ratios on the 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in the current account. We also include the lagged 
level of the dependent variable, the average growth rate of the world’s economies, the 
lagged growth rate of per capita income and country fixed effects.
21 For comparisons we 
include standardized beta coefficients for the contemporaneous changes in the current 
account. These are equal to the estimated coefficient multiplied by the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the change in the current account in the sample to the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable.  
Unsurprisingly there is a positive relationship between the savings ratio and 
reversals in all types of countries. However, there is also a difference between the core 
and the other groups. In the core, the savings ratio is more sensitive to changes in the 
current account measured by its beta coefficient. In the offshoots and periphery, there is 
no discernible difference between the impact of changes in the current account on the 
savings rate. 
Table 10 shows the association of the investment to GDP ratio with the current 
account. The estimating equation follows a parallel specification for the savings equation. 
Investment declines as the current account strengthens but there are very significant 
                                                 
21 Since T is large (34) for most countries in our panel, the Hurwicz-Nickell bias from including fixed 
effects and the lagged dependent variable is small, so we eschew GMM and other esoteric methods.  28 
differences between our various groups of countries. In the core and the periphery, 
investment clearly falls and makes up in the adjustment process what the rise in savings 
did not. In the offshoots the coefficient on contemporaneous investment is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Nevertheless the sensitivity of investment to changes in the 
current account in the following year is nearly the same as in the periphery in the 
contemporaneous year. While the lag structure is slightly different, the coarseness of the 
data should be taken into account and it is likely that investment moved in a similar way 
both in the offshoots and the periphery. The conventional wisdom is that savings, 
possibly out of higher incomes, prevented adjustment from being too choppy in the 
burgeoning offshoots. The data back this up and suggest that the rise in savings makes up 
for the majority of the compression in the current account with investment declines 
accounting for about half as much of the compression.  
Changes in public savings make up for the rest of the adjustment as Table 11 
demonstrates. Here the dependent variable is the ratio of government surplus to GDP. 
The point estimates suggest significant differences between our three groups of countries. 
In the periphery, where borrowing was frequently undertaken to plug fiscal gaps, we see 
that reversals would tend to be associated with a rise in the government surplus. In the 
core, and in the offshoots, the point estimates on the contemporaneous current account 
terms are both negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Together these tables point out that in the past a large majority of the adjustment 
process came through increased savings. At this stage we are unable to say whether these 
increases came out of higher incomes generated by previous investments in plant and 
infrastructure or whether they add up to a decline in aggregate demand. Based on the 
historical literature, we suspect that in the periphery it is more likely that we would see 
declines in aggregate output in the wake of current account reversals. This is so because 
much of the borrowing was not spent on productive enterprises. Even when it was 
productive, it was invested in development of single commodities that were vulnerable to 
large price shocks like guano or coffee. The fact that government deficit financing played 
a larger role in the periphery would tend to damage output growth too. First because 
much of the expenditure was to pay for current outlays rather than on investments and 
secondly because this type of borrowing is susceptible to crises of confidence which 
precipitate relatively large exchange rate swings (as we have seen for the floating 
periphery in Figure 20)  which add up to balance sheet crises as described in Bordo and 
Meissner (forthcoming).  
Tables 13 and 14 show the impact on per capita output growth of current account 
reversals. Adalet and Eichengreen (forthcoming) argued that reversals have been 
associated with lower growth in per capita income and Edwards found a similar result for 
the post-1970 period. Comparing our results directly to Adalet and Eichengreen is 
difficult because they pool the data between 1880 and 1997. They do not report separate 
coefficients for each period and follow a slightly different specification by using the 
average value of growth in the three years after a reversal as the dependent variable.  
In Table 12 we follow the specifications from Tables 10 through 12 and use the 
growth rate of income per capita as the dependent variable. We also include 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in the current account, the change in world GDP, 
lagged domestic growth and country level fixed effects. We find little evidence that 
changes in the current account are associated with changes in the conditional growth rates  29 
of per capita output. This is true for the pooled sample as it is in each of the sub samples. 
This is suggestive that current account reversals were not on average costly in terms of 
lost output during the first era of globalization.  
The virtuous cycle of investments, growing local capacity and import absorption 
in the surplus countries seems to be a stylized fact backed up by a broad statistical 
analysis of all available data. Moreover, as we have seen, only about a third of the 
reversals were associated with financial crises. As it happens, even these events do not 
seem to have been important enough in the overall sample to conclude that reversals are 
associated with output losses.  
In Table 13 we check the robustness of these results by using indicators for our 
four percent reversals rather than the changes in the current account as the key regressors. 
Here again we find no overwhelming evidence of slower growth during reversal 
episodes. In the pooled sample, none of the coefficients on reversals are individually 
statistically different from zero and jointly they are also statistically insignificant.  
Looking at the point estimates we find the following. In the core, growth is above 
average in the year of a reversal. In the offshoots, growth is lower by about two 
percentage points two years after a reversal but there is no difference in growth rates in 
the year of and one year after a reversal. In the periphery, growth appears to be lower one 
year after a reversal. Again the coefficient is only statistically significant at a generous 90 
percent level of confidence. The results here again contrast with those of Freund and 
Warnock (forthcoming). In the last 30 years they found that larger exchange rate 
movements led to lower output losses. Since we know the core and the offshoots clung to 
the gold standard while the periphery typically floated, it appears that, if anything, on 
average the gold standard countries with rigid exchange rates had higher growth than the 
periphery.
22 Taking the cumulative sum of the point estimates suggests that the offshoots 
themselves do have a larger dip in output in the wake of reversals than the rest of the 
periphery. This result is almost surely driven by the severe economic crisis in Australia in 
the 1890s that was analyzed most recently in Adalet and Eichengreen (forthcoming). 
In columns 6 through 8 we test whether openness to trade, the level of GDP per 
capita and currency mismatches affected output losses in the face of a current account 
reversal. We do so by separately interacting each of these controls with the 
contemporaneous reversal indicator. Edwards (2004) argued that more open economies 
were less likely to suffer growth slowdowns after a reversal. In theory a larger currency 
mismatch could make it so that a larger primary surplus would be needed to maintain 
fiscal sustainability in the face of a depreciation. An interaction between per capita output 
and the reversal indicator is ad hoc but asks the data whether stronger institutions and a 
better financial development allowed for easier adjustment. In column 6 we find that the 
interaction term with export openness is positive, but the marginal effect of a reversal at 
any level of openness is not highly statistically significant. Columns 7 and 8 are equally 
inconclusive. The impact of reversals does not appear to depend on the level of real 
output per capita nor on the level of the currency mismatch.  
Our last two tables suggest that current account reversals were not unambiguously 
associated with growth disasters in the first golden age of financial globalization. On the 
whole, the weight of evidence is for a “benign” view of current account reversals. If 
                                                 
22 This assertion holds up to more formal testing. When we interact the reversal indicator with the change in 
the real exchange rate, the marginal effect is not statistically different from zero.  30 
savings was rising and moving more than investment fell during reversals then this would 
suggest that a vast majority of reversals were accompanied by enough expenditure 
shifting (i.e., increases in net exports) so as to allow for continued trend growth. This 
evidence therefore suggests that prior to 1913 current account reversals were just part of a 
series of mostly amicable games of marbles à la Rueff. 
Summary: Smooth or Choppy Adjustment? 
Our overall assessment about current account reversals arises form a period that 
witnessed profound international integration in trade and capital markets. This integration 
had the industrial powerhouse of Western Europe behind it promoting capital imports in 
the periphery to further enhance domestic economic growth. The lending cycles often 
discussed in the literature are prevalent and emblematic of this largely symbiotic 
relationship. Reversals did occur and roughly one third of them were accompanied by 
large swings in exchange rates in the years preceding them or following them. However, 
capital markets were much more stabilizing in the past. They reacted to local events 
rather than global events and hence were less contagious (cf. Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh, 
2006). That being the case, current accounts persisted especially where markets had the 
confidence that due care was being taken to ensure profitable investment would 
eventually come on line.  
When reversals came, they were mostly accompanied by mild exchange rate 
fluctuations on the order of two to eight percent over the adjustment phase—nowhere 
near the 30 percent effective fluctuations that are envisaged by contemporary accounts of 
adjustment in the U.S. Growth in exports and higher productive capacity overcame the 
compression in government expenditure and investment that accompanied reversals and 
created reversal episodes that were not the growth mishaps that seem to be occurring 
more frequently these days. Why are the effects so different from era to era? Current 
account deficits and financial globalization in developing countries these days has often 
been associated with fiscal excess and failed development attempts. This most resembles 
what happened in the nineteenth century in the peripheral regions. But recently greater 
contagion and capital market spillovers have also contributed to international capital 
markets that seize up and lose liquidity even for good risks. Because of the maturity 
mismatch problem that afflicts countries, many projects go under funded during the 
downswing of the cycle. Looking forward after having looked backward, we believe the 
key determinant of whether current account reversals will be smooth or not will depend 
on continued confidence in the capital markets and continued efforts to improve future 
productive capacity in debtor nations. In this case, reversal will more likely be smooth 
and gentle rather than abrupt and abrasive. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have used a comparative economic history approach to study two hotly 
debated aspects of the current global imbalances: privilege and adjustment. 
  We find that the special and privileged position of the United States in the global 
economy of the late twentieth century appears to be on the wane. We make comparisons 
with the last imperial and hegemonic power, Britain in the late nineteenth century, and  31 
find some parallels. Although Britain was a net creditor, its ability to extract privilege 
appears to have been a phenomenon largely resulting from its status as a global financial 
pioneer in the 1860s and 1870s. After that period, yield differentials between home and 
foreign assets closed, and total returns differentials between home and foreign assets 
fluctuated above and below zero from decade to decade. 
  For the United States today, as compared to the 1960s, yield privilege appears to 
be draining away, falling from almost 3% to less than 1%, despite the rise of riskier 
foreign investment portfolios. The only reason that privilege has grown as a fraction of 
GDP is that the leverage has massively increased, with the U.S., like many other 
countries, vastly expanding its external balance sheet though large gross flows since the 
1980s. Naive trend extrapolation is always unwise, but it is especially unwise for 
privilege as a fraction of GDP, because the underlying trends are countervailing, and 
cannot be expected to carry on forever in the same way. The only offsetting factor is that 
U.S. capital gains on external wealth appear to be very strong in recent years, but the 
origin of these is a mystery and their extrapolation even more subject to doubt. If 
privilege continues to disappear as it has in the past then, all else equal, an even larger 
adjustment will be needed. 
What can history teach us about adjustment? We have examined the experience of 
a large sample of countries and compared their adjustment experiences with those from 
the recent past. There are striking differences between the results from the recent period 
and those from the past. Most notably current account deficits were often highly 
persistent while the adjustment process was not always as fraught with the economic 
distress economists typically predict today. 
Part of this suggests that persistent current account deficits backed by sound 
investments will pay dividends and expenditure switching and reduction will not have to 
be as abrupt as is commonly implied. The large and liquid capital market of London 
channeled local funds to emerging markets via fixed income investments and it managed 
to discriminate between good and bad borrowers. This led to differences in the 
willingness with which future deficits could be funded. It followed that the deficits in the 
fast-growing but capital poor countries were sustainable and they had rather smooth 
adjustments. This is to say that if history is any guide, the extent to which a hard landing 
will follow today’s current imbalances could hinge importantly on the confidence of the 
capital markets which is ultimately likely to be driven by the fundamentals.  32 
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Table 1 











  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NFA/GDP  0.023  0.001 0.025 0.015 0.040 0.039 
 (4.16)**  (0.08)  (4.39)**  (1.98)*  (16.51)**  (16.16)**
INFL*NFA/GDP    0.915   0.332   0.019 
   (1.76)    (2.12)*    (0.90) 
U.S.A  0.005  0.005 0.005 0.005    
  (9.95)**  (10.46)** (4.96)** (4.87)**    
GBR      0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 
      (5.38)** (5.22)** (1.89)  (1.99) 
CAN    -0.026  -0.025    
     (11.78)** (11.53)**   
FRA      0.002 0.002    
     (1.49)  (1.56)    
DEU      0.002 0.002    
     (1.82)  (1.77)    
ITA    -0.008  -0.008    
      (7.09)** (7.04)**    
JPN      0.006 0.006    
      (5.32)** (5.50)**    
Observations  23 23  161 161 44  44 
R-squared  0.45  0.52 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.87 
 
 
(b) Frequency of “Privilege”/”Penalty”† 
U.S.A 100%/0%  100%/0%  100%/0%  100%/0%     
GBR    76%/9%  71%/9%  80%/0%  85%/0% 
CAN    32%/68%  32%/68%    
FRA    56%/24%  56%/18%    
DEU    66%/16%  66%/16%    
ITA    32%/68%  32%/65%    
JPN    94%/0%  94%/0%    
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% 
** Significant at 1% 
† Observations more than 2 s.d. above/below r NFA/GDP, where r is the 
slope estimate. 
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Table 2 
Privilege: Relative to GDP, “Early” v “Late” 
 





 (1)  (2) 
NFA/GDP 0.013  0.051 
 (1.75)  (11.41)** 
EARLY 0.002  0.009 
 (1.69)  (2.93)** 
U.S.A 0.004   
 (3.45)**   
GBR   -0.011 
   (1.69) 
Observations 23  44 
R-squared 0.86  0.99 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% 
** Significant at 1% 
EARLY = 1 when year is less than or equal to 1880 (U.K.) or 1992 (U.S.). 
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Table 3 
G7 Rate of Yield Differentials (Assets versus Liabilities), 1981-2003 
 
 Obs Mean  Std.Error. [95%  confidence  interval]
U.S.A 23  0.0167*  0.0018 0.0130 0.0204
GBR 23  0.0009    0.0010 -0.0011 0.0030
CAN 23  -0.0139*  0.0021 -0.0182 -0.0096
FRA 23  0.0080*  0.0015 0.0049 0.0111
DEU 23  0.0032    0.0016 -0.0002 0.0066
ITA 23  -0.0052*  0.0015 -0.0083 -0.0021
JPN 23  0.0112*  0.0013 0.0084 0.0140
 





G7 Total Rate of Return Differentials (Assets versus Liabilities), 1981-
2003 
 
 Obs Mean  Std.Error. [95%  confidence  interval]
U.S.A 23  0.0369*  0.0117 0.0127 0.0612
GBR 23  0.0025    0.0060 -0.0099 0.0149
CAN 23  -0.0006    0.0151 -0.0319 0.0307
FRA 23  0.0019    0.0091 -0.0170 0.0207
DEU 23  -0.0062    0.0058 -0.0183 0.0059
ITA 23  -0.0034    0.0087 -0.0215 0.0147
JPN 17  0.0009    0.0186 -0.0385 0.0403
 
* significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5 




Current Account t-1 -2.26
[0.72]**
Change in the Current Account t-1 -0.12
[0.09]
Current Account x Gold Standard t  - 1  -0.20
[0.10]
Current Account  x ln(Real GDP per cap.) t -1 0.27
[0.09]**
Current Account x Exports/GDP t - 1 0.00
[0.00]














Number of obs 516
R-squared 0.24
Notes: Dependent variable is change in the ratio of the current account to GDP. The regression 
includes country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
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Table 6 
Countries and Years of Current Account Reversals 
 
Country    Years of 4 percent  Reversals 
Argentina   1885,  1891,  1912 
Australia    1887, 1891, 1893, 1899, 1904, 1905 
Belgium   1881,  1889,  1908 
Brazil   1886 
Chile   1888,  1898 
Denmark   1886 
Egypt   1909 
Finland   1893,  1901 
Greece    1883, 1885, 1893, 1897, 1904, 1906,  
Japan   1891,  1895,  1906 
New Zealand    1883, 1909 
Spain   1905 
Uruguay   1908,  1913 
Notes: See the text for the definition of a four percent reversal.  40 
 
Table 7 
Average Current Account Levels Before and After a Reversal 
 
Regressors Pooled Core ex. Financial Ctrs Offshoots Periphery Gold Std. Ctry-Years Non-Gold Ctry-Yrs
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current Account Reversal t + 3 -4.79 -8.10 -6.27 -4.24 -4.27 -5.83
[1.33]** [3.45]* [2.57]* [1.75]* [1.32]** [2.85]*
Current Account Reversal t+2 -5.75 -7.48 -6.91 -5.21 -5.38 -6.30
[1.34]** [2.65]** [2.46]** [1.82]** [1.28]** [2.85]*
Current Account Reversal t + 1 -7.88 -12.77 -7.58 -7.19 -8.17 -7.21
[1.19]** [6.11]* [1.84]** [1.28]** [1.46]** [1.93]**
Current Account Reversal -1.39 -3.24 -1.28 -1.31 -1.13 -1.83
[1.05] [2.57] [1.81] [1.44] [0.96] [2.38]
Current Account Reversal t-1 -2.55 -7.52 -1.33 -2.50 -1.45 -3.81
[1.33] [4.02] [2.12] [1.73] [1.65] [2.15]
Current Account Reversal t-2 -3.72 -7.52 -1.80 -3.80 -3.65 -4.00
[1.08]** [2.16]** [1.57] [1.41]** [1.07]** [2.08]
Current Account Reversal t-3 -2.40 -3.43 0.45 -3.38 -1.56 -3.34
[1.14]* [0.24]** [1.49] [1.63]* [0.83] [2.13]
Number of obs 728 138 112 366 521 207
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.32
Notes: Dependent variable is the level of the current account. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for precise 
definitions of variables.  





Changes in Real Exchange Rates Before and After Current Account 
Reversals 
 
Regressors Pooled Core ex. Financial Ctrs Offshoots Periphery Gold Std. Ctry-Years Non-Gold Ctry-Yrs
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current Account Reversal t + 3 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
Current Account Reversal t+2 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.08
[0.02] [0.01]** [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04]
Current Account Reversal t + 1 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0 -0.07
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]* [0.01] [0.04]
Current Account Reversal -0.02 -0.01 0 -0.04 0.01 -0.09
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03]**
Current Account Reversal t-1 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01]* [0.02] [0.01] [0.03]
Current Account Reversal t-2 0 0.01 -0.01 0 0 0
[0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.04]
Current Account Reversal t-3 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0 0.07
[0.01]* [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]* [0.01] [0.02]**
Number of obs 689 140 112 353 495 194
F-Statistic 1.11 3.60*** 1.77* 1.77* 0.83 3.03***
R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.11
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the real exchange rate. Robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
 




Dynamics of the Ratio of Savings to GDP 
 
Regressors Pooled Core ex. Financial Ctrs Offshoots Periphery
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S/GDP t-1 -0.23 -0.02 -0.17 -0.21
[0.05]** [0.02] [0.06] [0.03]**
Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  0.78/0.49 0.71/0.73 0.85/0.56 0.83/0.54
[0.09]** [0.01]** [0.17]* [0.22]*
Lagged Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  -0.13 0.04 -0.15 -0.04
[0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.09]
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP All Countries  -0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.04
[0.09] [0.01]* [0.10] [0.11]
Lagged Growth in per capita GDP -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
[0.04] [0.03] [0.10] [0.05]
Constant 3.10 0.37 2.06 2.27
[0.78]** [0.26] [0.86] [0.24]**
Number of obs 471 96 96 151
R-squared 0.41 0.55 0.44 0.45
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the ratio of domestic savings to GDP. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  








Dynamics of the Ratio of Investment to GDP 
 
Regressors Pooled Core ex. Financial Ctrs Offshoots Periphery
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I/GDP t-1 -0.23 -0.10 -0.17 -0.30
[0.06]** [0.04] [0.11] [0.06]**
Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  -0.17/0.18 -0.27/0.38 -0.07/0.06 -0.24/0.26
[0.06]* [0.00]** [0.17] [0.08]*
Lagged Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  -0.18 0.01 -0.25 -0.19
[0.04]** [0.06] [0.05]* [0.11]
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP All Countries  0.08 0.11 0.05 0.10
[0.05] [0.01]** [0.14] [0.06]
Lagged Growth in per capita GDP 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
[0.05] [0.03] [0.09] [0.09]
Constant 3.25 1.43 3.00 3.65
[0.89]** [0.68] [2.30] [0.83]*
Number of obs 471 96 96 151
R-squared 0.17 0.23 0.12 0.24
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the ratio of investment to GDP. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  
Absolute values of standardized beta coefficients are listed in row 2 after the estimated coefficients. 
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Table 11 
Dynamics of the Government Surplus Divided by GDP, 1880-1913 
 
Regressors Pooled Core ex. Financial Ctrs Offshoots Periphery
Ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Govt. Surplus/GDP t-1 -0.77 -0.71 -0.31 -0.83
[0.11]** [0.19]* [0.08]* [0.12]**
Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  0.05/0.05 -0.02/0.04 -0.02/0.06 0.10/0.08
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05]*
Lagged Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  -0.02 -0.08 0.06 -0.04
[0.07] [0.04] [0.03] [0.11]
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP All Countries  -0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.18
[0.04] [0.01] [0.08] [0.09]
Lagged Growth in per capita GDP 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.12
[0.02]** [0.01] [0.02] [0.03]**
Constant -0.85 -0.26 -1.37 0.07
[0.12]** [0.06]* [0.45] [0.11]
Number of obs 619 123 119 268
R-squared 0.41 0.36 0.23 0.46
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is the change in the ratio of the government surplus to GDP. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust clustered 
standard errors re in parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  






Growth Dynamics vs. the Current Account, 1880-1913 
 
Regressors Pooled Core Ex Fin.Centers Offshoots Periphery
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.17
[0.10] [0.07] [0.14] [0.13]
Lagged Change in Ratio of Current Account to GDP  -0.02 0.06 0.29 -0.07
[0.06] [0.04] [0.31] [0.07]
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP All Countries  0.40 0.11 1.16 0.17
[0.13]** [0.06] [0.48] [0.17]
Lagged Growth in per capita GDP -0.24 -0.07 -0.22 -0.25
[0.04]** [0.09] [0.09] [0.07]**
Constant 1.13 1.44 0.14 1.41
[0.20]** [0.10]** [0.71] [0.28]**
Number of obs 756 155 128 345
R-squared 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.10
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. All regression include country fixed effects. Robust clustered standard errors re in 
parentheses. See the text for precise definitions of variables.  
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Table 13 
Growth Dynamics and Current Account Reversals, 1880-1913 
 
Regressors Pooled Core Ex Fin.Centers Offshoots Periphery Openness Wealth Mismatch
ex. Offshoots
(1) (2) (3) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Current Account Reversal t -0.52 1.09 -1.14 -0.67 -2.72 -3.49 -1.12
[0.88] [0.21]** [2.82] [1.30] [2.82] [7.24] [1.14]
Current Account Reversal t-1 -0.60 0.27 0.02 -0.95  ---  ---  ---
[0.99] [0.15] [4.04] [0.53]*
Current Account Reversal t-2 -0.13 -0.75 -2.71 1.20  ---  ---  ---
[0.84] [0.60] [0.90]* [0.91]
Current Account Reversal t-3 0.85 -0.30 -0.27 2.34  ---  ---  ---
[1.14] [0.54] [2.55] [1.80]
Current Account Reversal t  X Exports/GDP  ---  ---  ---  --- 0.08  ---  ---
[0.10]
Current Account Reversal t  X Lagged GDP per Capita  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0.38  ---
[0.97]
Current Account Reversal t X Currency Mismatch  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 0.77
[1.03]
Exports/GDP  ---  ---  ---  --- 0.01  ---  ---
[0.02]
Lagged GDP per Capita  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -3.32  ---
[0.97]**
Mismatch  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- -0.15
[0.14]
Avg. Growth Rate of GDP per capita all countries  0.44 0.10 1.26 0.25 0.44 0.46 0.55
[0.13]** [0.05] [0.51] [0.16] [0.13]** [0.13]** [0.16]**
Constant 0.75 1.31 0.05 0.84 0.57 26.23 0.75
[0.20]** [0.09]** [0.68] [0.28]* [0.43] [7.44]** [0.23]**
Number of obs 730 150 124 332 787 787 582
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
* p-value < 0.1; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
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Difference (Adjusted minus Traditional)
Note: This figure uses a 4% discount rate (or a Hausmann-Sturzenegger
PE ratio of 25) based on the estimated yield in Table 1.
Figure 6
Rate of Yield on British Investments


































Source: Davis and Huttenback (1986).47
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Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).48
Figure 8












1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Yield on external 
assets
Yield on external 
liabilities
Difference = Rate of Yield Privilege 
(trend---)
Sources: BEA, Historical Statistics
Figure 9
U.S. Rates of Yield and Differentials: Comparison with G7
year





G6 (G7 ex. U.S.) and G7 are averages weighted by positions, i.e. total
income divided by total position, for all 6 or 7 countries, expressed
in U.S.D.
Sources: IFS, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)49
Figure 10
What Might Have Been: U.S. Investment Income Privilege as a Fraction of
GDP,  Actual  (declining  yield  differentials)  versus  Counterfactual
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Figure 11
U.S. Total Rate of Return Differentials: Comparison with G7
year





G6 (G7 ex. U.S.) and G7 are averages weighted by positions, i.e. total
income  and  capital  gain  divided  by  total  position,  for  all  6  or  7
countries, expressed in U.S.D.
Sources: IFS, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2004)50
Figure 12
































Box and Whisker Plot:
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Figure 14
Box and Whisker Plot:
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Figure 15
Arithmetic  Average  of  the  Current  Account  Surplus  in  Periphery,
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Figure 16
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Figure 17
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Figure 19 
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Figure 21 
Average  and  Median  Changes  in  Real  Exchange  Rates  Before,  During  and 
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Data Sources and Notes 
 
Countries in our econometric samples 
 
Argentina (SI), Australia (SI), Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Canada (SI), Denmark 
(SI), Egypt, Finland (SI), France (SI), Germany (SI), Greece, India, Italy (SI), Japan (SI), 
Netherlands (SI), New Zealand, Norway (SI), Portugal, Russia, Spain (SI), Sweden (SI), 
Switzerland, United Kingdom (SI), United States (SI), Uruguay 
 
Not all countries appear in each of the 34 years which we analyze. (SI) indicates the 






Current  accounts  for  Australia,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States are from Jones 
and  Obstfeld    Saving,  Investment,  and  Gold:  A  Reassessment  of  Historical  Current 
Account Data available at  http://www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld/ 
 
For  the  Netherlands  the  source  is  Smits,  Horlings,  and  van  Zanden  (2000)  at 
http://nationalaccounts.niwi.knaw.nl/start.htm Calculated as GNP-GDP + Net exports of 
merchandise and services 
 
For Chile the current  account statistics come  from Braun, Briones  Díaz,  Lüders, and 
Wagner (2000) while GDP statistics from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).  
 
For  all  other countries we  used  the  trade  balance  as  a  proxy  for  the  current  account 
balance. 
 
GDP and GDP per capita: Data underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
 
Real Exchange Rates: Data underlying Bordo, et al (2001). 
 
Savings and Investment Ratios: Taylor (2003) 
 
Government Surplus: Data underlying Bordo, et al (2001). 
 
Exports GDP: Data underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
 
Currency Mismatch: Data underlying Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) 
 